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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUNISHING
PREGNANT SUBSTANCE ABUSERS UNDER
DRUG TRAFFICKING LAWS: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF A BODILY FUNCTION
Despite a recent government survey indicating a decline in drug
use, cocaine abuse, especially in the form of crack, remains a na-
tional epidemic,' and a growing number of women are among its
victims. 2 Yet government and media concern has recently focused
According to the 1990 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse ("Survey"), "cur-
rent" cocaine use has dropped 42% since 1988. HHS News Press Release, U. S. Dept of
Health and Human Serv. (Dec. 19, 1990). "Current" use is defined by the survey as "use at
least once in the past month," Survey results recorded 2.9 million current cocaine users in
1988, as compared with only 1.6 million in 1990. Id. Although the number of current users
has declined, the number of people who use cocaine daily, i.e. abusers, rose front 292,000 in
1988 to 336,000 in 1990. According to the survey, crack use has remained stable. Id.
The National Household Survey, conducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse
("NIDA"), sampled 9,259 people aged twelve and over. People who are homeless, or who
live in hospitals, prisons, nursing homes, dormitories or military bases were excluded from
the survey. Some officials criticized the Survey as misleading, noting that drug use has
declined among middle and upper class individuals, but remains an "intractable epidemic in
poverty-ridden inner cities and ... the number of hard-core cocaine users is increasing."
Some Battles Won in Drug War; Hard•Core Use Still on the Rise, Newsday, City Edition, Dec. 20,
1990 at 7. Indeed, NIDA's chief' statistician for the survey stated that the reported decline
among cocaine users was statistically insignificant, because the estimate was derived from
only 63 out of 9,259 responses. U.S. Survey Shows Sharp Drop in Illegal Drug Use, Wash. Post,
Dec. 20, 1990, at A 1. "It's a good chance it's just random error in the sample," the statistician
said. Id.
In addition to the government's survey and media response, medical commentators also
report that cocaine use remains an epidemic. See, e.g., Hannan & Adler, Crack abuse: Do you
know enough about it?, 88 POSTGRADUATE MED. 141, 141 (1990). Because cocaine is an illicit
drug and use is likely to be under-reported, it is difficult to estimate accurately the prevalence
of cocaine use today. H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, QUITTING COCAINE 21 (1989), at 19-20. One
commentator has estimated that in the United States, approximately 30 million people have
tried cocaine, and about two million people are compulsive cocaine users. Digregorio, Cocaine
Update: Abuse and Therapy, 41 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 247, 247 (1990). Crack cocaine is
particularly prevalent. Id. Cocaine in the intranasal form is hydrochloride salt. "Crack" is
produced by adding an alkaline, such as sodium bicarbonate, to the hydrochloride. The
mixture is then cooked in water. Small pieces separate from the water, forming "rocks" which
are then smoked either separately or mixed in tobacco. Hannan & Adler, supra, at 141.
Crack's prevalence stems from its intense "high," its convenience, and its low price (as low
as one dollar per dose). Id; see also Gawin, Cocaine Abuse and Addiction, 29 J. FAM. PRAC. 193,
193-94 (1989).
2 NIDA figures estimate that 10% of pregnant women have used cocaine. Pregnant Drug
Abusers Find Hope in Program, N. Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at B3, col. 1. New York City's
Health Commissioner states that "[t]he drug epidemic, particularly the crack cocaine epi-
demic, has hit New York City's women and their babies hard." Id. Pregnant women have
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on the most vulnerable of cocaine's victims—those drug-exposed
infants born to cocaine-addicted mothers. 3 Treatment programs for
pregnant addicts are almost non-existent,'' and the number of drug-
exposed infants born to addicted mothers has reached frightening
numbers. 5 This escalation has prompted states to take punitive ac-
tion against pregnant substance abusers in order to "protect" their
unborn children.
In July, 1989, Jennifer Johnson, a crack cocaine addict, was
convicted of delivering cocaine to a minor.° The minor was John-
son's newborn daughter, and the drug was "delivered" through
Johnson's umbilical cord.'' The conviction is noteworthy as the first
prosecutorial success in a string of failed attempts to make pregnant
addicts criminally responsible for harm to their unborn children. 8
Prior to State v. Johnson, prosecutors had typically attempted to hold
traditionally been denied access to treatment facilities, although some specific programs are
currently being established. Id.; see also Fink, Effects of Crack and Cocaine Upon Infants: A Brief
Review of the Literature, 10 CHILDRENS LEGAL Ricurs J. 2, 2 (1989) (citing a National Associ-
ation for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education (NAPARE) survey showing that 11%
of women use drugs during pregnancy).
As many as 375,000 infants annually could be affected. N. Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1990,
at 133, col. 1; Fink, supra note 2, at 2-3.
Drug Use in Pregnancy: New Issue for the Courts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at A14, cols.
1-2 [hereinafter Drug Use in Pregnancy]. Even where treatment centers exist, pregnant women
are often denied access because of their pregnancy. McNulty, Combatting Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation in Access to Substance Abuse Treatment for Low-Income Women, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., May
1989, at 21. McNulty states that quilost drug treatment programs categorically do not admit
pregnant addicts, because clinics lack obstetrical expertise, because a pregnant addict is
considered 'high-risk' and drains away a disproportionate share of treatment resources, or
because they fear obstetrical malpractice suits." Id. at 22. Another commentator refers to the
absence of treatment facilities as a "serious public health problem." K. Moss, G. Guerrero,
K. Kolbert, Pregnant Addicts and Alcoholics: Legislative Proposals and Policy Considerations
for State Legislators 8 (1990) (unpublished memorandum on file at the Boston College Law
Review).
5 It is estimated that 375,000 newborns are affected by maternal substance abuse. N. Y.
Times, Dec. 17, 1990, at 3, col. 1. One survey of New York City drug treatment programs
revealed that 87% did not accept pregnant crack addicts on Medicaid. Moss Memorandum,
supra note 4.
6 Information about the Johnson case comes from the following sources: Trial Tran-
scripts, State v. Johnson, No. 89-890—CFA, (Seminole County, Fla. 1989); Newborn Drug
Conviction a 'Drastic' First, L.A. Times, July 31, 1989, at I, col.1 [hereinafter Newborn Drug
Conviction]; Do Pregnant Women Lose Legal Rights?, 2 Colic. Q. EDITORIAL RES. Rio'. 414, 419
( July 28, 1989) [hereinafter Pregnant Women]. The Johnson case is presently on appeal to the
Florida District Court of Appeals. For a discussion of appellant's arguments on appeal, see
generally Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 278 (1990) (citing
Appellant's Initial Brief, Jennifer Johnson v. State, No. 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. brief
filed Dec. 28, 1989)).
7 Pregnant Women, supra note 6, at 419.
See id.
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pregnant substance abusers liable for fetal harm under statutes
never intended to apply to fetuses, such as child abuse or involun-
tary manslaughter statutes. These attempts have been largely un-
successful.° Thus, the Johnson case is unique because it marks the
first time a prosecutor has used a drug trafficking statute success-
fully against a woman who used drugs during pregnancy."' This
case provides prosecutors with the only successful strategy to date
for holding pregnant women criminally responsible for harm to
their unborn children." Since the Johnson conviction, at least four
other states have prosecuted pregnant substance abusers for um-
bilical cord drug "delivery" to their fetuses. 12
I) Id; see also Drug Use in Pregnancy, ,supra note 4, at A14, cols, 1-2. In re Ruiz is one of
the few cases to hold that a viable fetus is a "child" under the state's child abuse statute,
although the court did so in the context of removal proceedings. 27 Ohio Misc.. 31, 35, 500
N.E.2d 935, 939 (1986). Courts are increasingly willing to find that prenatal substance abuse
is grounds for removal proceedings. See, e.g., In re Noah M., 212 Cal, App. 3d 30, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 309, 314 (court upheld removal order for drug-exposed infant); Department of Social
Servs. v. Felicia B,, 144 Misc. 2d 169, 171, 543 N.Y.5.2c1 637, 638 (Fain. Ct, 1989) (newborn
with positive cocaine toxicology report sufficient for finding of neglect); In re Danielle Smith,
128 Misc. 2d 976, 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (Farm Ct. 1989) (court held an unborn child
is a "person" for purposes of the state's child neglect statute).
One of the earliest and most publicized attempts to criminalize a pregnant woman's
behavior was People v. Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. (Cal. Mun, Ct. Feb. 23, 1987). In
October 1986, after her baby was born with severe brain damage, Ms. Stewart was charged
with violating California's child neglect statute. The state argued that Stewart failed to provide
proper medical care for her baby by ignoring her doctor's advice not to take drugs and to
discontinue sexual intercourse during her pregnancy, and for failing to seek prompt medical
attention when she noticed problems during her pregnancy. See Note, The Criminalization of
Maternal Condiut During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L.J. 357,
358 (1989). In addition to drug trafficking charges, Jennifer Johnson was also charged with
child abuse. Trial Transcripts at 7, Johnson, No. 89-890-CFA. Judge Eaton found Ms.
Johnson not guilty of child abuse. Transcript of Motion for Rehearing and Sentencing,
Johnson, No. 89-890-CFA. In Illinois, a prosecutor failed to win a manslaughter indictment
against a woman for the alleged drug-related death of her newborn daughter. Pregnant
Women, supra note 6, at 419.
10 Newborn Drug Conviction, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1; Pregnant Women, supra note 6, at
419.
" Pregnant Women, supra note 6, at 419. The Johnson case presents two conceptually
different problems. On the one hand, the prosecution's argument focused on umbilical cord
"delivery" immediately following birth. Yet the harmful conduct (smoking crack cocaine),
and most of the "delivery," occurred before birth. This note concentrates on the maternal
delivery prior to birth, viewing the prosecution's characterization of "delivery" as a fiction
created to avoid the usual fetal rights controversy. See infra notes 219-28 and accompanying
text for a discussion of umbilical cord delivery as a criminal "act."
j2 Drug Use in Pregnancy, supra note 4, at A 14, cols. 1-2. For example, in Massachusetts,
Josephine Pelligrini was indicted for unlawful (umbilical cord) delivery of cocaine to a minor,
Mother charged with Exposing Fetus to Cocaine, Boston Globe, Aug. 22, 1989, Metro sec. at 1,
col. 1. On October 15, 1990, the Superior Court for Plymouth County dismissed the charges,
citing Ms. Pelligrini's constitutional right to privacy. Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No. 87970,
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Some commentators argue that efforts to criminalize maternal
conduct are dangerous attempts to create "fetal rights" in conflict
with a woman's constitutional right to privacy.' 3 Others advocate
providing legal protection for the unborn." The Johnson approach,
which would essentially make all pregnant substance abusers drug
trafficking felons, raises issues distinct from the right to privacy
arguments used by commentators to analyze previous "fetal rights"
cases.' 5
 By labeling an involuntary biological process (transfer of
maternal blood through the placenta) a criminal "act," the Johnson
case raises the question of what kind of "act" is sufficient to impose
criminal responsibility.'€
The United States Supreme Court addressed this substantive
law issue in the context of addiction in Robinson v. California" and
Powell v. Texas. 18
 The Supreme Court in Robinson held that punish-
slip op. at 329 (Sup. Ct. Plymouth County, Mass., Oct. 15, 1990), cited in Comment, Solving
the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39
EMORY L.J. 1401, 1407 n. 58 (1990). In Michigan, a state appeals court overturned a lower
court decision which would have allowed prosecutors to try Kimberly Hardy for umbilical
cord delivery of a controlled substance. Fetal Drug-Delivery Case is Overturned, Wall Street J.,
Apr. 3, 1991, at B6, col. 1. The court stated that the drug trafficking statute did not apply
to pregnant drug users. Id. The prosecutor plans to appeal the ruling. Id. Similar cases are
pending in South Carolina. See Comment, supra, at 1407 n.58 (1990).
I See Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 614-20 (1986); Note, Maternal Rights
and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse", 101 HARV. L. REV. 994,
998-1002 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Maternal Rights]; Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy
and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANCE 277, 314-15 (1987-88) [hereinafter Note, Pregnancy Police].
" See Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of Life,
51 U. Cm. L. REV. 257, 267-70, 295-98 (1982); Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the
Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 99-104 (1984); Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide
Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1231-34 (1987).
15 See Johnsen, supra note 13, at 614-20; Note, Maternal Rights, supra note 13, at 995-
1002. On technical grounds, the Johnson case does not raise the right to privacy analysis that
is central to the usual "fetal rights" arguments. The prosecution focused on a point in time
immediately after birth, but before the umbilical cord was cut. Thus, according to the
prosecution, Ms. Johnson "delivered" cocaine to a minor person, nut a fetus. Trial Transcripts
at 26, State v. Johnson, No. 89-890—CFA, (Seminole County, Fla. 1989). In fact, the prose-
cution specifically characterized the case as a "child abuse case." Id.
Most commentators arguing in favor of women's reproductive rights view the fetal rights
issue as one tied to the abortion debate, raising right to privacy issues. Although this argument
is valid, this note suggests that the central issue cannot rest on a question of when life begins.
Rather, the issue must be the status of addiction itself and whether pregnant drug addicts
can be held criminally responsible for their addiction. See infra text accompanying notes
222-45 for a discussion of criminal responsibility and pregnant substance abusers.
31 See infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of what type of "act"
is necessary to impose criminal liability for umbilical cord drug transfers.
17 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
'" 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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ing someone for the "status" of being a drug addict, without any
affirmative act, was a violation of the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause of the eighth amendment.'" Some commentators have
argued that the Robinson Court carved out a substantive limit on
criminal responsibility. 2"
The Court in Powell rejected this argument and distinguished
Robinson on factual grounds. The Powell Court stated that public
drunkenness is an act and not a status, and therefore upheld the
statute making public drunkenness a crime. 2 ' The Robinson and
Powell decisions define the constitutional limitations on state legis-
lation with regard to addictive behavior, and are therefore appli-
cable to cases where pregnant drug addicts are prosecuted under
state drug trafficking statutes. 22
This note examines the problem of holding pregnant substance
abusers criminally responsible for the harm that their addiction
causes to their fetuses, and addresses the question of whether their
addiction can be classified as a "status" protected under the cruel
and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment. Section
I briefly discusses the history and evolution of the "fetal rights"
controversy, the context from which the Johnson case has arisen."
Section 11 examines the nature of cocaine and addiction. 24 Section
III analyzes Robinson and Powell to explain how the Supreme Court
has treated addiction under the criminal law. Section IV then ana-
lyzes addiction and criminal responsibility in the context of preg-
nant substance abusers charged under drug trafficking laws. 25 This
note proposes that punishing pregnant substance abusers under
drug trafficking laws, by characterizing the maternal-fetal placental
exchange as a criminal act, actually punishes the woman for her
status as a pregnant addict and therefore violates the eighth amend-
ment. 2" This note suggests that although the state of Florida in the
Johnson case purported to regulate drug trafficking, it was actually
attempting to regulate Ms. Johnson's drug use. 27 This note concludes
°' Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67.
20 See Cuomo, Mem Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 463,487 n.123 (1967).
In Powell, Justice Marshall stated that under the Court's interpretation, "Robinson . . . brings
this Court but a very small way into the substantive criminal law," 392 U.S. at 533.
Powell, 392 U.S. at 532.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 145-72 for a discussion of Robinson. For a discussion
of Powell, see infra text accompanying notes 186-206.
23 See infra notes 29-100 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 102-36 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 209-54 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
27 See id.
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that even if the eighth amendment does not prohibit the criminal-
ization of maternal drug use during pregnancy, Florida and other
states should seriously consider the policy enunciated in Robinson
before they punish pregnant addicts for drug use. 28
I. FETAL RIGHTS
A. Evolution and Expansion of Fetal Rights
The recent use of drug laws to hold pregnant substance abusers
criminally responsible for fetal harm is part of a growing trend of
recognizing rights in the unborn. 29
 This trend, the "fetal rights
controversy," encompasses a wide range of issues relating to mater-
nal behavior during pregnancy." Advocates of judicial or legislative
intervention into a woman's pregnancy view the fetus as a person
who has rights separate from the pregnant woman. 3 ' Commentators
who favor women's reproductive freedom argue that any such in-
tervention amounts to an unconstitutional intrusion into a woman's
right to privacy and bodily integrity. 32
 The controversy today pits
mother against fetus."
2" See infra notes 246-54 and accompanying text.
" See Drug Use in Pregnancy, supra note 9, at A14, col. 2; Pregnant Women, supra note 6,
at 419; Newborn Drug Conviction, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1.
3" See Comment, The Fetal Rights Controversy: A Resurfacing of Sex Discrimination in the
Guise of Fetal Protection, 57 UMKC L. REV. 261, 273 (1989) (whether or not a pregnant woman
should work in certain environments); see also Mother Versus Child, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at
84-87 (whether or not a woman should be forced to deliver by caesarean section or undergo
blood transfusions). Finally, some commentators worry that women may someday be con-
strained from eating certain foods or engaging in certain recreational activities. Pregnant
Women, supra note 6, at 422-24; Johnsen, supra note 13, at 606-07.
3' See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 14, at 100-04. Describing "fetal abuse," Shaw goes so far
as to advocate taking "custody" of the fetus to prevent harm. Id. at 100. Shaw also uses the
word "children" to describe both the born and the unborn, which implies that a fetus has
rights completely separate from the pregnant woman. Id. at 102; see also Note, Maternal
Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1230
(1987) (describing the conflict between the "rights of the mother" and the "rights of the
fetus").
32 See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 13, at 603-04.
" See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 III. 2d 267, 276, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1988).
In Stallman, the Illinois Supreme Court, overturning a decision recognizing a cause of action
by a fetus against the mother, stated that if such an action were allowed,
fIvIlother and child would be legal adversaries from the moment of conception
until birth . . The law will not now make an error with . . . enormous
implications for all women who have been, are, may be, or might become
pregnant. The law will not treat a fetus as an entity which is entirely separate
from its mother.
Id. at 276-77, 531 N.E.2d at 359; see Mother Versus Child, A.B.A. J. Apr. 1989 at 84-88;
Johnsen, supra note 13, at 603-04.
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Historically, the law has been reluctant to recognize rights in
the unborn." Courts viewed the fetus and the woman as one indi-
vidual, and only recognized the fetus for limited purposes, such as
inheritance." An historical prerequisite for recovery at common
law was that the fetus be "subsequently born alive." 36 Thus, a child
conceived prior to the death of a testator could inherit if born
alive.37
Despite an early recognition of fetal rights in property law, tort
claims for prenatal injuries, such as those suffered during child
birth, were denied on grounds that there could be no duty owed to
a person not in existence at the time of the injury." Bonbrest v. Kotz,
decided in 1946 by the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, was the first case to hold that a child could sue. for
prenatal injuries sustained when the fetus was viable." In Bonbrest,
the fetus was injured by the physician during delivery." The court
stressed that the fetus was viable at the time of the injury, and
reasoned that to deny recovery to a child for prenatal injuries would
be to allow a wrong without a remedy. 4 ' The court rejected the idea
that the fetus was only a "part" of the mother for purposes of
34 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973). The Court in Roe stated that,
except in the area of abortion,
the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it,
begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly
defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth
. . . Nile unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the
whole sense.
Id. But cf. Reproductive Health Serv. v. Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3050 (1990) (Court upheld
Missouri statute stating that. Missouri laws must be construed to grant unborn children all
the "rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons"); see also W.P. KEETON, D.
Dorms, K. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 55 (5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter PROSSER & KEETON]; Note, Pregnancy Police, supra, note 13 at 279.
" See, e.g. Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240, 247, 13 A. 414, 417 (1888); McLain v.
Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 279, 79 N.W. 182, 183 (1899).
36 See, e.g., McLain, 120 Mich. at 279, 79 N.W. at 183; Johnsen, Fetal Rights, supra note
13, at 602.
37 See Cowles, 56 Conn. at 247, 13 A. at 417; McLain, 120 Mich, at 279, 79 N.W. at 183.
36 The leading case was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884).
Subsequent decisions relied heavily on this case. See Stanford v. St. Louis S.F.R. Co., 214 Ala.
611, 612, 108 So. 566, 566 (1926); Allaire v. St. Lukes Hosp., 184 III. 359, 367, 56 N.E. 638,
639 (1900); Bud v. United States Rys. Co., 248 Mo. 126, 131, 154 S.W. 71, 72 (1913).
39 65 F. Supp, 138, 142 (1946). The Bonbrest court factually distinguished Dietrich as a
case denying a cause of action for an injury transmitted to the fetus through "other inter-
vening substances" (the mother). Id, at 140. ln Bonbrest, however, the injuries occurred during
the child's delivery, and were thus inflicted directly on the child. Id. at 139.
4° Id. at 139.
4 ' Id. at 14 i (citing Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D. L. R. 337 (Can. 1933)).
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recovery against a third party. 42 Despite the Bonbrest language de-
scribing the fetus as something more than a part of the mother, the
court compensated the injured child and the parents without grant-
ing the prenatal child legal rights entirely separate from, or in
conflict with, those of the pregnant woman. 43 Following Bonbrest,
courts reversed previous decisions denying recovery," and today
every jurisdiction recognizes a cause of action for prenatal injuries. 45
Wrongful death statutes, which facially apply to infants who
die due to prenatal injuries, 46 are consistent with common-law rec-
ognition of prenatal injuries as violations of parental rights. 47 A
majority of jurisdictions, however, have interpreted the word "per-
son" to include fetuses in wrongful death statutes, which in effect
eliminates the live birth requirement. 48 One commentator has re-
garded these court decisions as compensating the parents for the
loss of their expected child, and as protecting the pregnant woman's
interests.49 Thus, recognizing fetuses in wrongful death actions is
consistent with earlier prenatal injury cases and is not a grant of
separate fetal rights. 50
At common law, the first case to erode the live birth require-
ment by recognizing that the fetus can be the victim of a crime was
Id. at 140.
45 Id.; Johnsen, supra note 13, at 602 n.10; see also Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ili. 2d
267, 280, 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (1988) (holding that there is no cause of action by a fetus,
subsequently born alive, against its mother for prenatal injuries). The Stallman court reasoned
that, although the law recognizes the fetus as more than a part of the mother, "the law will
not treat a fetus as an entity which is entirely separate from its mother." 125 III. 2d at 276-
77, 531 N.E.2d at 359. If such a tort were created, the court reasoned, "tmlother and child
would be legal adversaries from the moment of conception." Id. at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
" See, e.g., Leas v. C.C. Pitts Sand and Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Texas 1967)
(allowing cause of action for prenatal injuries); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1233, 258
S.W.2d 577, 581 (1953) (holding that a viable fetus had a cause of action for negligence
inflicted by a third party).
45 PaossEu & KEETON, supra note 34, at 368.
46 Wrongful death statutes apply to "persons." Therefore, if an infant is born and then
dies, the statute is automatically invoked. The problem arises when a fetus is injured and
dies before birth.
47 Johnsen, supra note l3, at 603.
45 See, e.g., Etch v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 100, 300 So. 2d 354, 358 (1974);
Gorke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 262, 181 A.2d 448, 451 (1962); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 361, 331 N.E.2d 916, 920 (1975). Only a few states have specifically
included the unborn in the state's wrongful death statute. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 70,
para. 2.2 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-1 (1987); see also Note, No Liability for the
Wrongfitl Death of Unborn Children— The Florida Legislature Refuses to Protect the Unborn, 16 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 835, 847 (1988).
49 Johnsen, supra note 13, at 603 n.15.
5° Id. at 603.
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Commonwealth v. Cass, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in 1984. 5 ' The Cass court held that a viable fetus was
a person under the state's vehicular homicide statute. 52 In Cass, the
defendant's motor vehicle struck a woman who was eight and one-
half months pregnant.55 Her fetus died from internal injuries
caused by the accident. The court reasoned that viability, rather
than live birth, was a better standard for determining personhood
under the state's vehicular homicide statute. 54
One commentator perceived the erosion of the live birth re-
quirement as a dangerous step towards holding pregnant women
accountable for their actions during pregnancy." Indeed, the trend
has been towards increased judicial intervention in the lives of
pregnant women." The Cass decision, which held a third party liable
for the death of a woman's fetus, has provided the foundation for
one state to institute charges against a pregnant woman for the
death of her fetus under the state's vehicular homicide statute."
Such a prosecution extends beyond mere compensation for parents,
and contradicts the policy behind early prenatal recovery. 58
51 392 Mass. 799, 808, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (1984). Prior to Cass, the common law
rule in criminal law was the same as for civil recovery. Id. at 805, 467 N.E.2d at 1328. Some
states include the unborn in general homicide statutes. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West
Supp. 1988) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
atbrethought"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1987) ("Homicide means conduct which
causes the death of a person or an unborn child with which a woman has been pregnant for
more than twenty-four weeks.. . ."). A few states have enacted specific feticide statutes
making the destruction of a fetus a homicide or manslaughter. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch .
38, para. 9-1.1(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85). The Illinois statute states:
A person commits the offense of feticide who causes the death of a fetus if, in
performing the acts which caused the death, he, without lawful justification: (l)
either intended to kill or do great bodily harm to the mother carrying the fetus
or knew that such acts would cause the death or great bodily harm to the mother
Id.
52 Cass, 392 Mass. at 808, 467 N.E.2d at 1330.
"Id. at 799-800, 467 N.E.2d at 1325.
Si Id. at 807, 467 N.E.2d at 1329. The Cass court cited to its decision in Mone v.
Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E. 2d 916 (1975) (holding that a viable fetus is a
person under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute). In Mone, the court reasoned that
there is no sound reason to choose live birth over viability when deciding whether an action
for prenatal injuries cast lie. Id. at 360-61, 331 N.E.2d at 919.
" Johnsen, supra note 13, at 603-04.
56 See Pregnant Women, supra note 6, at 419.
57
 Waltham, Massachusetts woman was arrested on July 14, 1989, and charged with
vehicular homicide for the death of her eight and one half month old fetus. The woman
was allegedly driving drunk. Fetal Endangerment Cases on the Rise, Boston Globe, Oct. 3, 1989,
at I, col. 1. The charges were eventually dropped.
55 See infra notes 59-90 and accompanying text for other examples of actions creating
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B. The Present State of Fetal Rights Law
As concern for fetal welfare grows, courts and state officials
have increasingly scrutinized women's conduct during pregnancy.
To protect the interests of the fetus, pregnant women have been
incarcerated, 59 forced to undergo medical treatment, 6° and more
recently, criminally prosecuted. 6 ' Cases in which a woman is forced
to submit to a caesarean birth, 62 or undergo a forced blood trans-
fusion, 65 treat the mother and fetus as completely independent
entities, with opposing rights." 4 Similarly, punitive measures, such
as taking protective custody of the fetus by incarcerating the preg-
nant woman, also pit mother against fetus, with the "rights" of the
fetus prevailing. 65
an adversarial relationship between mother and fetus; see also Johnsen, supra note 13, at 604,
607 (Ms. Johnsen predicts that the Can holding may be expanded to apply to pregnant
women rather than third parties),
59 See D.C. Judge jails Woman as Protection for Fetus, Wash. Post, July 23, 1988, at A 1, col.
1.
6° See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. App. 1987), vacated and reh'g granted, 539 A.2d
203 (D.C. App. 1988); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J.
421, 424, 201 A.2d 537, 538, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
61 See infra notes 70, 75 and 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criminal
prosecution of pregnant women for alleged harm to their fetuses.
67 1n re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 at 617. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld a trial court's authorization for the George Washington Hospital to perform
a caesarean operation on a dying woman, against the woman's wishes. Id. The child died two
hours after the caesarean birth and the mother died two days later. In Jefferson v. Griffin
Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a court ordered caesarean.
247 Ga. 86, 89, 274 S.E. 2d 457, 460 (1981). In another case, a court ordered a caesarean
when a Nigerian woman refused based on her Muslim religion and her preference for
natural childbirth. See In re Maydun, 114 Daily Wash. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26,
1986), cited in Mother v. Child, A.13.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 84; see also Mother v. Fetus—The Case
of "Do or Die:" In re A.C., 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. Sc Pot- 319, 330 n.65 (1989). In 1984,
another Nigerian woman was restrained with wrist and ankle cuffs after refusing to volun-
tarily submit to a caesarean. See Pregnant Women, supra note 6 at 417.
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp., 42 N.J. at 424, 201 A.2d at 538 (court
authorized blood transfusions that pregnant woman rejected on religious grounds); In re
Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (blood transfusions
ordered against pregnant woman's wishes).
64 See Pregnant Women, supra note 6, at 416-17. Mother and fetus are treated as persons
with conflicting rights because the mother refuses treatment or caesarean birth, and a court
orders the treatment in the best interests of the fetus. Note, Rethinking (M)Otherhood: Feminist
Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 Hattv. L. REV. 1325, 1333-37 (1990).
6' See infra text accompanying notes 78-81 for a discussion of the Vaughn case, in which
a judge jailed a pregnant woman in order to protect her fetus from her drug use. See also
Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 III. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988), for another example of a
court action that pits mother against fetus. In denying a cause of action by a child against
his mother for prenatal injuries, the court reasoned that:
lilt would be a legal fiction to treat the fetus as a separate legal person with
rights hostile to and assertable against its mother. The relationship between a
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The 1977 California Court of Appeals case of Reyes v. Superior
Court" provides an early example of a prosecutor's attempt to apply
a child abuse statue to a woman's prenatal substance abuse. In Reyes,
a pregnant heroin addict was charged with felony child endanger-
ment under a California statute because her twins were born ad-
dicted to heroin and suffering from withdrawal symptoms.'" A
public health nurse had warned the mother that continued use of
heroin and her failure to seek prenatal care would endanger the
fetus. Based on the legislative intent and the language of the Cali-
fornia statute, the judge held the statute inapplicable to prenatal
conduct." The judge also reasoned that the statute required that
the offender be responsible for the care and custody of a child,
which assumes that there exists a living child "susceptible" to care
and custody."
In 1987, a San Diego municipal court judge reached a similar
decision in the much-publicized case of People v. Stewart," where a
woman was unsuccessfully prosecuted for prenatal conduct that
allegedly caused the death of her newborn son. 71 Ms. Stewart sought
prenatal care during her third trimester when she learned her
preganancy was complicated by placenta previa, a condition that
blocks the cervical opening. 72 During her last month of pregnancy,
Ms. Stewart began bleeding, was rushed to the hospital, and sub-
mitted to a caesarean section. Her son was born with severe brain
damage, and died shortly after birth. Eight months later, Ms. Stew-
art was charged with criminal child neglect under a child support
statute," for failing to follow her doctor's instructions not to engage
pregnant woman and her fetus is unlike any other plaintiff and defendant
... No other defendant must go through biological changes of the most
profound type, possibly at the risk of her own life, in order to bring forth an
adversary into the world.
Id. at 278, 53l N.E.2d at 360 (emphasis added).
66 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
67 Id. at 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13.
66 Id. at 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 912. At the time of the alleged offense, section 273(a) of
the California Penal Code stated "any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely
to produce great bodily harm or ,...havingaving the care or custody of any child, .. .
willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health
is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment . ..." Id. at 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (quoting
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1988)).
69 Id. at 217-18, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14.
" No. M508197, slip op. (San Diego Ct. Feb. 1987) (cited in Note, Maternal Rights, supra
note 13, at 994).
71 Pregnancy Police, supra note 13, at 287.
72 Id. at 286 n.58.
" Id. Ms. Stewart was charged under section 270 of the California Penal Code, which
provides that:
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in sexual intercourse during her pregnancy and for allegedly taking
illegal drugs. A San Diego judge ruled the statute inapplicable and
dismissed the charges.74
In another attempt to hold a pregnant woman criminally re-
sponsible for harmful prenatal conduct, the Illinois State Attorney
in 1989 filed involuntary manslaughter charges against a woman
whose cocaine use allegedly caused the death of her child two hours
after birth. 75
 The prosecutor alleged that the mother's cocaine use
during pregnancy was reckless and showed disregard for her child's
life.76
 The indictment failed and the court dismissed the charges. 77
Although attempts to prosecute women criminally under child
abuse statutes have failed, other measures to protect the fetus have
been successful. In 1988, for example, in the District of Columbia
Superior Court, a judge jailed a pregnant woman to protect her
fetus from the pregnant woman's cocaine use. 78 The woman, a first-
time offender, was arrested for second-degree theft. 79 Because she
tested positive for cocaine, the judge sentenced her to 180 days in
prison, despite the United States Attorney's recommendation of
probation. 8° The judge reasoned that the mother had an addictive
personality and her fetus would be protected in jail. 8 '
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter, or medical attendance, or other remedial care
for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not exceeding two thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year .. .
A child conceived but not ye( born is to be deemed an existing person
insofar as this section is concerned,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988).
" Chambers, Charges Against Mother are Thrown Out, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at A25,
col. 1. The legislative history behind section 270 shows that the statute's purpose was to
require fathers to provide financial support to women pregnant with their children. Id.
75 Mother Charged After Her Baby Dies of Cocaine, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1989, at A18, col.
I. An autopsy report found that oxygen deprivation, which is linked to cocaine use late in
pregnancy, caused the infant's death. Id.; see also Pregnant Women, supra note 6, at 419.
76
 Pregnant Women, supra note 6, at 419.
77 Id.
75 See D.C. Judge Jails Woman as Protection for Fetus, Wash. Post, July 23, 1988, at Al, col.
1 [hereinafter D.C. Judge). The judge was quoted as saying "I'm going to keep her locked
up until the baby is born because she's tested positive for cocaine when she came before me
[1]11 be darned if I'm going to have a baby born that way." Pregnant? Go Directly to Jail,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988 at 20, [hereinafter Directly to Jail); see also Pregnant Women, supra note
6, at 422 (citing to other instances where pregnant women have been incarcerated in the
interest of the Cetus).
79 Pregnant Woman, supra note 6, at 419.
'° Directly to Jail, supra note 78, at 20; D.C. Judge, supra note 78, at Al, col. I.
81 Directly to Jail, supra note 78, at 20. In addition to cases where judges sentence in
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In contrast to previous cases in which prosecutors have unsuc-
cessfully attempted to apply child abuse statutes to fetuses, State v.
Johnson stands out as the first criminal conviction in the United
States of a mother giving birth to a drug-exposed infant. 82 In John-
son, decided in 1989 in the Florida Circuit Court for Seminole
County, a judge held that Florida's drug trafficking statute applied
to the placental exchange between a pregnant woman and her
fetus." According to testimony, Ms. Johnson, an admitted cocaine
addict, smoked crack the morning of her labor. 84 Her newborn
tested positive for cocaine metabolytes.85 Ms. Johnson was then
charged with delivery of a controlled substance to a minor" and
child abuse. 87
Although Ms. Johnson was prosecuted for cocaine delivery to
both her newborn and a child born fourteen months earlier, the
case focused on her most recent childbirth. The prosecution alleged
that Ms. Johnson delivered cocaine to her infants through the um-
bilical cord, focusing on the moment immediately following birth,
but before the umbilical cord was cut." The prosecution was thus
able to argue that, in each birth, cocaine was delivered to a child
and not a fetus. 8" During her most recent pregnancy, Ms. Johnson
sought admittance to an outpatient drug treatment program, but
was denied enrollment because she was pregnant."" On another
occasion, Ms. Johnson summoned an ambulance because she be-
order to protect the unborn, pregnant substance abuse is also grounds for removing custody
of the infant. See, e.g., In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. l l 1, 116, 293 N.W.2d 726, 741 (1980).
See also supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion of other removal cases.
"2 Newborn Drug Conviction, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1.
' 3 Trial Transcripts at 365-66, State v. Johnson, No. 89-890—CFA (Seminole County,
Fla. 1989). Judge O.H. Eaton stated to Ms. Johnson, "I'm not here to put you in prison, nor
do 1 think that is an appropriate sentence in this case, but I feel that you and others like you
need to come into compliance with the law. That's the reason I think this prosecution is justified.
That's the reason I've felt it was justified all along." Transcript of Motion for Rehearing and
Sentencing at 10, Johnson, No. 89-890—CFA (emphasis added).
" Trial Transcripts, at 15, Johmon, No. 89-890—CFA.
" 3 Id. at 74-75. It should be noted that if Ms. Johnson had not used cocaine 72 hours
prior to giving birth, the baby's urine would have contained no traces of cocaine, This is
because cocaine will only remain in the blood stream for between 48 and 72 hours. Id, at
155.
a4J See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(I)(c)(1) (West 1976).
87 See FLA. S'rAT. ANN. § 827.04 (West 1976). Ms. Johnson was found not guilty of the
child abuse charge due to lack of evidence. Trial Transcripts, at 366, Johnson, No. 89-890—
CFA.
" Motion to Dismiss at 27, Johnson, No. 89-890—CFA.
" Trial Transcripts, at 6-7, Johnson, No. 89-890—CFA. The prosecutor was thus able
to avoid the right to privacy arguments associated with the abortion debate.
"° Newborn Drug Conviction, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1.
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lieved she might have overdosed on crack cocaine. 9 ' The prosecutor
used these facts to show that Ms. Johnson had knowledge that she
was harming her fetus by using cocaine during her pregnancy. 92
The Johnson defense attempted to introduce testimony explain-
ing crack addiction and its effect on Ms. Johnson's volition." The
judge sustained the prosecution's objection that the testimony was
outside the witness's expertise." Thus, the Johnson court never en-
tertained arguments linking crack abuse to a loss of control or lack
of volition.
Judge Eaton sentenced Ms. Johnson to fifteen years probation
on each of the two counts of delivering cocaine to a minor." The
first year of probation was to be served on "community control" for
added supervision. 96 In addition, Judge Eaton stipulated that Ms.
Johnson enter a drug counseling program, supplemented with men-
tal health treatment and educational and life skills courses. 97 Judge
Eaton's sentence also required that Ms. Johnson submit to monthly
drug and alcohol tests, remain gainfully employed, and perform
200 hours of public service work. Finally, Ms. Johnson was required
to report to her probation officer any future pregnancies. The scope
of Judge Eaton's sentence thus exemplifies the power of using a
criminal statute to punish pregnant substance abuse.
As community concern grows over the effects of the drug
problem, drug abuse is increasingly the target of criminalization."
The erosion of the live birth rule and the expansion of fetal rights,
combined with the growing problem of prenatal drug abuse, has
convinced some commentators that criminalization is feasible. 99 In-
deed, state prosecutors and legislators are currently focusing on the
criminal process as a means to eradicate substance abuse during
9 ' Id.
92 Trial Transcripts at 1 16-17, Johnson, No. 89-890—CFA.
93 Id. at 237-41.
94 Id. at 241.
9' Transcript of Motion for Rehearing and Sentencing, at 21, Johnson, No, 89-890—
CFA.
96
 Id.
97 Id. at 23.
9R Ideas and Trends, Punishing Pregnant Addicts: Debate, Dismay, No Solution, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 10, 1989, at E5, col. 1 [hereinafter Punishing Pregnant Addicts); Pregnant Women, supra
note 6, at 419, 423. Media attention has focused on substance abuse during pregnancy, and
such behavior seems to be the impetus behind most prosecutions fur "fetal abuse." See, e.g.,
Directly to Jail, supra note 78, at 20; Fetal Endangerment Cases on the Rise, Boston Globe, Oct.
3, 1989 at I, col. I.
" See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 13, at 606.
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pregnancy.'°° Addiction, however, is a complex biological and psy-
chological condition.'°' To determine whether the state can achieve
its goals of eradication and deterrence through criminalization, one
must understand this complexity.
IL COCAINE AND ADDICTION
Although cocaine has been in use for centuries, it is only re-
cently that the drug and its effects have caused widespread con-
cern.t 02 Cocaine dependency, once thought to be a predominately
male problem, is on the rise in women of childbearing age.'° 3 A
recent survey of thirty-six United States hospitals found that ap-
proximately eleven percent of the women treated had used dan-
gerous substances during pregnancy. 1 °4 In New York City, health
officials have estimated that drug-exposed births have increased
3000%.' 05 The problem is not limited to large cities, however, given
the recent prosecutions of pregnant substance abusers in such places
as Laramie, Wyoming and Muskegon, Michigan. 1 °6 Thus, substance
abuse during pregnancy has become a national problem.
A. The Nature of Cocaine
Derived from the Erythroxylon coca plant, cocaine was used in
South America for thousands of years.'" 7 It made its European
debut in 1860, when a scientist extracted the alkaloid and gave it
its present name. 1 °8 The history of the drug reveals a lack of un-
I" Punishing Pregnant Addicts, supra note 98, at E5, cols. 1-6.
1 ° 1 Id. Sec infra text accompanying notes 122-36 for a discussion of addiction.
102 Gold, Galanter & Stimmel, Editorial, Cocaine: A New Epidemic, 6 ADVANCES ALCOHOL
& SUBSTANCE ABUSE, Winter 1986, at 2.
105 DRUG USE  IN PREGNANCY: MOTHER AND CHILD 17 (Ira J. Chasnoff, ed. 1986) [here-
inafter Chasnoff]; H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note I, at 21. A 1987 N1DA survey indicated
that 30% of women between the ages of 18 and 24 used illicit drugs, which, according to
one commentator, was "a number reflecting the increased prevalence of crack use among
women." Fink, supra note 2, at 2.
104 Birth of a Bad Idea; Jailing Mothers for Drug Abuse, The Nation, May 1, 1989, at 585;
Fink, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting a 1988 survey by the National Association of Perinatal
Addiction Research and Education (NAPARE).
101 Fink, supra note 2, at 2.
'" Case Against Pregnant Woman Is Dismissed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at 10, col. 3
(Wyoming child abuse case against pregnant woman using alcohol is dismissed); Mother to
Stand Trial in "Crack Baby" Case, UPI, Feb. 2, 1990 (NExts 1990) (Michigan prosecution of
pregnant crack cocaine addict for "umbilical cord" drug delivery).
107 H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note 1, at 13.
105 Id. at 19.
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derstanding of its true properties.'" For instance, cocaine was a
popular additive in tonics and other non-prescription remedies, and
was even an ingredient in Coca-Cola."° Although cocaine was out-
lawed as a "narcotic,"' It it did not until recently receive any concen-
trated attention as a dangerous drug. 12 As recently as 1973, in fact,
cocaine was hardly mentioned in a well-known report by the Na-
tional Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse."'
Cocaine is a stimulant that affects the central nervous system
by increasing electrical activity in the brain.'" It is typically associ-
ated with feelings of intense euphoria, competency, and well-
being."' These reactions, however, are all dependent on many dif-
ferent factors, including the individual drug-user, the frequency of
drug use, and the method of administration."° The method of
administration, in particular, is relevant to cocaine addiction." 7 In-
tranasal administration, referred to as snorting, was formerly the
most common way to use cocaine." 8 Smoking cocaine, however,
especially "crack" cocaine,"° has become increasingly popular and
this method of administration is more toxic and addictive than the
intranasal method.' 2" Not only is crack thought to be more depen-
1 °9 Gold, Galanter & Stimmel, supra note 102, at 2.
" 1) SHAFFER & JONES, supra note 1, at 14.
"' Id. at 29. Although cocaine is not a narcotic, it was erroneously classified as a narcotic
under the Harrison Tax Act. Under federal law, punishment for cocaine trafficking and use
is the same as for narcotics.
"2 See Gold, Galanter & Stimmel, supra note 102, at 2.
13 H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note I, at xv. In the early period of the cocaine
epidemic, medical knowledge about the drug was sparse, and few treatment programs existed.
See Washton & Gold, Recent Trends in Cocaine Abuse: A View for the National Hotline, "800-
COCAINE", 6 ADVANCES AI.COHOL & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, Winter 1986, at 32.
''' See G. BENNETT, C. VOURAKIS & D. WOOLF, SUBSTANCE ABUSE, PHARMACOLOGIC,
DEVELOPMENTAL AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 57 (1983).
115 Numerous commentators report that users liken the cocaine high to sexual orgasm.
See, e.g., Gawin & Ellinwood, Cocaine and Other Stimulants, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1174
(1989); McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation of a Dangerous Drug, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 537, 551 (1973).
16 H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note I, at 15.
"2 Id. at 18. Comparing routes of cocaine administration, one commentator states that
"Isimoking (crack and freebase) and intravenous use ... all create more rapid, intense highs
. . . Casual or recreation use is virtually unknown for the rapid-absorption smoking or
intravenous rapid administration routes." Gawin, supra note 1, at 194.
"" Id. at 15.
119 "Crack" is the common term for a crystalline form of cocaine freebase. Freebase is
the process by which the pure part of cocaine is extracted from its chemical base. This can
be accomplished in a relatively simple process using sodium bicarbonate, water and heat.
Washton, Crack, the Newest Lethal Addiction, MED. ASPECTS HUM. SEXUALITY, Sept. 1986, at 49.
120
 See H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note I, at 16; Hannan & Adler, supra note 1, at
141; Gawin & Ellinwood, supra note 115, at 1174, 1175; Gawin, supra note 1, at 194. When
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deuce-inducing, it is cheaper and more convenient than powder
cocaine.' 2 ' Thus, crack appears to be one of the present drugs of
choice in the abuser community.
B. The Meaning of Cocaine Addiction
Until recently, the majority view of experts was that cocaine
was psychologically but not physically addictive.' 22 Some researchers
now suggest that cocaine may indeed create physical dependence
by affecting the brain's neurotransmitter system. 123 Although diver-
gent opinions still exist on whether cocaine is addictive, the overall
research suggests that cocaine is physically addictive for some peo-
pie.124 In fact, recent data suggests that chronic cocaine use may
actually cause neurophysiological brain damage.' 25 One of the major
problems confronting any attempt to classify cocaine as addictive is
the lack of consensus on the definition of "addiction" itself. Al-
though there are many theories of addiction, the biological model
cocaine is smoked, the cocaine crosses the blood-brain barrier more swiftly. Thus, the highs
are more intense, and the lows, or crashes, are lower. Id. Jennifer Johnson was addicted to
crack cocaine.
141 Crack is more convenient in that it is easier for the dealer to handle, prepare and
transport. H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note I, at 16; Washton, supra note 119, at 49.
' 22 See. McLaughlin, supra note 115, at 552 (stating that cocaine "does not cause physical
dependence"). A cursory explanation of psychological addiction is that the user thinks he or
she is dependent whereas physical addiction refers to a chemical process whereby the user
develops a tolerance to the drug, and will become physically ill if the drug is withdrawn. See
H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note 1, at 41. Many researchers now dispute the view that
cocaine is only psychologically addicting. See, e.g., Cloud, Cocaine, Demand and Addiction: A
Study of the Possible Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725,
744-46 (1989) (describing cocaine as a "self reinforcer" that indicates physical dependence);
see also H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note 1, at 42 (stating that cocaine, unlike heroin, was
not thought to produce physical withdrawal symptoms because the symptoms are difficult to
document); Cregler, Adverse Health Consequences of Cocaine Abuse, 81 J. NAT'L. MED. A. 27, 33
(1989) (stating that "[Ile myth that cocaine is not addicting because it does not induce
physical dependence has been an important factor in fostering widespread acceptance" while
noting that "[t]he issue of physical dependence due to cocaine is still somewhat controversial").
See also infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text for a more extensive discussion of the
"biological" model of addiction.
125 I)ackis, Gold & Pottash, Central Stimulant Abuse: Neurochemistry and Pharrnacotherapy, 6
ADVANCES ALCOHOL & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, Winter 1986 at 7-8; Gawin & Ellinwood, supra
note 115, at 1178; Cocaine Reinforcement and Extracellular Dopamine Overflow in Rat Nucleus
Accumbens: An In Vivo Mircrodialysis Study, 498 BRAIN RES. 199, 199-203 (1989).
' 24 Gawin and Ellinwood, .supra note 115, at 1173-78; see also Cloud, supra note 122, at
740-41; Cregler, supra note 122, at 27, 33; It should be emphasized, however, that cocaine
is not addictive for everyone. According to one researcher, "[airs estimated 95% of the 20 to
30 million individuals who have used cocaine have thus far avoided dependence, promoting
the illusion that cocaine can be used safely." Gawin, supra note I, at 193.
125 Gawin & Ellinwood, supra note 115, at 1178.
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is increasingly cited as a credible explanation for cocaine addic-
tion.' 26
The biological model of addiction focuses on the effects of a
drug on the brain's chemistry.' 27
 Gerierally, any type of drug alters
the brain's chemistry. 128 Once the drug enters the user's blood
stream, it then crosses the "blood-brain" barrier, which means that
it joins with the chemicals found in the brain.' 29 Located in the
brain are chemical messengers called neurotransmitters. These neu-
rotransmitters are responsible for carrying information from one
nerve cell (neuron) to another. When activated by an electrical
impulse in the brain, the neurotransmitters carry their chemical
message to the synapse, the gap between neurons where the neu-
rotransmitter releases its message. The neurotransmitter can then
be taken back to the original neuron. This is known as the "re-
uptake" mechanism.' 3°
Continued cocaine use interferes with the neurotransmission
of dopamine by inhibiting the re-uptake process.'s' This interfer-
ence causes the dopamine to stay in the synapse rather than be
taken back to the original neuron.'" By blocking dopamine's re-
125
 A discussion of the numerous models of addiction is beyond the scope of this note.
See generally H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note 1, at 45-62. Even the use of the term
"biological" addiction is arbitrary, as it is the term favored by one particular researcher. An
equivalent term might be "drug tolerance" or "physical dependence." Cloud, supra note 122,
at 739. There is continuing disagreement about the proper terminology of addiction. For
example, a U.S. Surgeon General report equated the terms "drug addiction" and "drug
dependence." Id. at 738 n. 50. The World Health Organization, on the other hand, replaced
the term "drug addiction" with "drug dependence." Id. at 742 n. 77. Despite the disagree-
ment, many researchers agree that addiction is a combination of many factors, such as
"psychological, physiological and chemical processes." Id. at 738.
127
 H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note 1, at 73. The term "biological" model of addiction
is only one researcher's term for physical addiction or dependence. It is used throughout
this article because it is relatively straightforward. Many medical researchers have referred
to this model as the "dopamine depletion hypothesis." See infra notes 127-35 and accom-
panying text. See, e.g., Cregler, supra note 122, at 29 ("The dopamine depletion hypothesis
states that the pathophysiology underlying repeated cocaine administration is the drug's
ability to increase synaptic dopamine transiently. Chronic cocaine use appears to deplete
brain dopamine. Alterations in dopamine neurotransmission may be responsible for the development
of compulsive use patterns." (emphasis added)).
' 2D See, e.g., G. BENNErr, C. VOURAKIS & D. Wootx, supra note 114, at 57.
129
 H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note 1, at 73.
Ilf}
 Id.; see also Dackis, Gold & Pottash, supra note 123, at 14-15.
11 H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note 1, at 73; see Holloway, Rx For Addiction, Sc,. AM.,
Mar. 1991, at 97-8.
In H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note I, at 74. As one scientist explained, "[cocaine]
hops on board the [re-uptake transporter] shuttle, leaving no room for the dopamine, which
continues to bombard its receptors, causing heightened feelings of pleasure ." Holloway,
supra note 131, at 98.
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uptake, chronic cocaine use eventually inhibits the brain's ability to
manufacture dopamine on its own, which in turn results in dopa-
mine depletion.'" Because dopamine is the neurotransmitter asso-
ciated with pleasure, dopamine depletion is what researchers believe
causes chemical depression and a craving for cocaine.' 34 Thus, the
addict needs cocaine to maintain a normal mood and chemical
balance in the brain.'" This addiction model helps explain why
cocaine becomes central to some users' lives despite serious reper-
cussions. 136
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE REGULATION OF ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIOR
In 1925, the United States Supreme Court recognized narcotics
addiction as a disease.'" Today, drug abuse and addiction is one of
the most dangerous societal problems facing our country.'" The
United States is now engaged in a "War on Drugs," characterized
by a call for stiff criminal penalties and more prison space.'" Al-
though a general consensus exists that the drug epidemic needs
serious attention, debate over the best way to approach the problem
continues.'" Many policymakers favor criminal penalties as the ob-
vious way to attack drug-related behavior, yet many commentators
question whether the threat of incarceration will deter those in-
volved. 14 I
133 H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note I, at 74.
"4 Id. at 73-74; Dackis, Gold & Pottash, supra note 123, at 16.
"5 H. SHAFFF.R & S. JONES, supra note I, at 74.
135 Cloud, supra note 122, at 740. Describing addiction, Cloud states "cocaine is addicting
for some users. This fact presents policymakers with special problems because addicts con-
tinue to consume cocaine despite the possible catastrophic consequences of their behavior,
including arrest, imprisonment, and loss of employment, families, friends, and physical
health." Id. at 736. Another researcher states that "during binges, cocaine addicts have no
interest in sex, nourishment, sleep, safety, survival, money, morality, loved ones, or respon-
sibilities," Gawin, supra note 1, at 194.
137 Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5,18 (1925).
13"See, e.g., A National Attack on Addiction is Long Overdue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23,1986, at
B6, col. 1 [hereinafter National Attack]. According to one commentator, "the National Institute
on Drug Abuse has called cocaine 'the drug of greatest national public health concern',
estimating there are two million addicts—four times the number of heroin addicts." Gawin,
supra note 1, at 193,
09 National Attack, supra note 138, at B6, col. I; H. SHAFFER & S. JONES, supra note 1, at
xiv—xv; Cloud, supra note 122, at 733 n.34.
14" See generally Cloud, supra note 122.
141 Id. at 735, 777 n.228; see also Punishing Pregnant Addicts, supra note 98, at E5, cols. I-
6.
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In an early example of state criminalization directed at drug
abuse, the Supreme Court in the 1962 case of Robinson v. California
interpreted the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth
amendment as limiting state action against a drug addict. 142
 In
Robinson, the Court held that a state could not punish the mere
status of being an addict, in the absence of some criminal act. 143 In
the 1968 case of Powell v. Texas, however, the Supreme Court stated
that the crime of public drunkenness was not a status under Rob-
inson, but rather was an act for which criminal responsibility could
be imposed.'" These two cases, because they deal with addiction
and criminal responsibility, provide a framework for analyzing the
criminal responsibility of pregnant addicts charged under drug
trafficking laws.
A. Robinson v. California
In Robinson v. California, the United States Supreme Court held
that punishing a person for the status of being a narcotics addict,
when the person engaged in no criminal act, violated the cruel and
unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment. 145 The de-
fendant, Robinson, was standing on a Los Angeles street when he
was arrested. 195
 He was not arrested for selling, using, or being
under the influence of narcotics."' He was simply arrested for being
a narcotics addict. Evidence at trial stipulated that a Los Angeles
police officer noticed scars, alleged needle marks, and a scab on
Robinson's arm. Thus, pursuant to a California statute that made
it a misdemeanor to "be addicted to the use of narcotics,"" 8
 Rob-
inson was arrested, tried by jury in Los Angeles Municipal Court,
and convicted. 149
 After losing an appeal in the Appellate Depart-
145 See 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
143 Id. at 667.
144
 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968).
145
 370 U.S. at 667,
I" Id. at 661.
147 Id. at 661-62.
'" The statute, section 11721 of the California Health and Safety Code, provides: "No
person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting
when administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the State to prescribe
and administer narcotics." Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Cone
§ 11721 (West)).
It should be noted that Robinson could have been convicted of narcotics use. There was
evidence at trial that he admitted to using narcotics. The trial judge, however, instructed the
jury that they could convict if they found that Robinson either used narcotics or was an addict.
Id. at 665.
149 Id. at 661
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ment of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the United States
Supreme Court noted jurisdiction for possible unconstitutionality
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments."°
The Court, in holding that the state could not punish a person
for the status of being an addict, noted that the states, through
exercise of the police power, have the right to regulate drug
traffic."' This power, the Court reasoned, is an important compo-
nent of a state's ability to protect the public health and welfare. The
Court noted, for example, that it would be appropriate for a state
to ban the sale, purchase, manufacture or possession of narcotics.
Similarly, the Court stated that states have the power to compel
treatment for addicts, with incarceration as a penalty for non-com-
pliance. 152
 In addition, the Court noted that states could institute
educational and social programs to combat the drug problem on a
wider scale.' 53
The Robinson Court stated, however, that the California statute
did not punish the use, purchase, sale or possession of narcotics.' 54
Rather, the Court reasoned, the statute criminalized the "status" of
addiction for which an offender could be continuously guilty.' 55
The Court cited to precedent establishing that narcotics addiction
is a disease.' 56 The Court reasoned that imprisonment for such an
affliction would be akin to punishing someone for having a "com-
mon cold."'" Length of punishment was immaterial, the Court
reasoned, because imprisonment for an illness, for any length of
time whatsoever, would be cruel and unusual punishment. 158
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, clarified the reasons
why criminally punishing a drug addict was cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment.' 56
 Justice Douglas used
mental illness and insanity as an analogy to narcotics addiction,
tracing the history of the violent punishment of the mentally ill. 16°
150 Id. at 664.
15 ' Id.
152
 Id. at 665.
153 Id.
154
 Id. at 666.
155 Id.	 7
"" Id. at' 667 n.8.
57
 Id. at 667. The Court further analogized: "It is unlikely that any state at this moment
in history would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a
leper, or to be afflicted with a veneral disease." Id. at 666.
E" Id. at 667.
159 Id. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring).
160 Id. Justice Douglas stated that "in Sixteenth Century England one prescription for
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Justice Douglas also explored drug addiction, quoting a medical
report describing what it means to be physically dependent on
drugs. 16 ' After a description of an addict as one of the "walking
dead," Justice Douglas concluded that although it is understandable
that communities are afraid of addicts and that their first response
might be to punish them, punishment is only justified when the
addict commits a criminal act. 162
 He stated that it is unjust to make
simply being an addict a crime in itself. 163
 Justice Douglas reasoned
that if addicts could be punished for their addiction, than so too
could the insane be punished for their affliction. Justice Douglas
viewed both the addict and the insane person as being afflicted with
a disease, and thus worthy of being treated , as sick persons.' 64
Justice Clark, in dissent, did not agree that punishing someone
for being addicted to the use of narcotics was a cruel and unusual
punishment. 165
 Rather, Justice Clark viewed the California statute
as providing the type of compulsory treatment and involuntary
confinement that the majority would condone.' 66 Justice Clark
noted that section 11721, under which Robinson was convicted,
punished "volitional" addiction, which differs from the type of com-
pulsive addiction with which the majority was concerned.' 67 If an
addict was found to have lost self-control, California provided for
rehabilitation governed by a civil proceeding. Moreover, even if the
California scheme was interpreted as punitive rather than thera-
peutic, Justice Clark argued that addiction is a threat to the public.
Thus,it is reasonable that a state may choose to outlaw addiction.'"
Justice White also dissented, arguing that the California statute
punished Robinson for his regular use of narcotics.' 69 Justice White
stated that it was impossible to separate drug use from the mere
status of addiction, because the very definition of "addiction" re-
insanity was to beat the subject 'until he had regained his reason' . . . . In America 'the
violently insane went to the whipping post and into prison dungeons or, as sometimes
happened, were burned at the stake or hanged. — Id.
161 Id. at 671 (Douglas, J., concurring), Justice Douglas quoted from a report on narcotics
addiction from the American Medical Association, which described the "physiological dis-
turbance" of the drug addict. Id.
162 Id. at 672, 674 (Douglas, J., concurring).
163 Id. at 674 (Douglas, J., concurring).
' 64 Id.
1"3 Id. at 679 (Clark, J., dissenting).
1b6 Id. at 682 (Clark, J., dissenting).
16' Id. at 681 (Clark, J., dissenting).
16' Id. at 685 (Clark, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 686 (White, J., dissenting).
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quires repeated use of drugs.'" Justice White viewed the majority's
protection of the addict as logically including protection for drug
use. ' 71
 Justice White argued, therefore, that the majority's decision
limited a state's power to regulate narcotic use.' 72
Although the Robinson Court concluded that a person could
not be held criminally liable for his or her "status," the Court never
enunciated specific criteria as to what constitutes a "status" and what
constitutes an "act."'" The Model Penal Code, however, provides
guidance as to what constitutes an "act" for which criminal liability
can be imposed. 174
 According to the Model Penal Code, an act must
be voluntary before a person can be found criminally responsible.'"
If an action is involuntary, the deterrent goal of the criminal law
would not be effectuated, because involuntary actions cannot be
deterred. Thus, according to the Model Penal Code, non-volitional
actions, such as a reflex, convulsion, or actions during sleep, are not
the type of "acts" punishable under the criminal law.' 76 Similarly,
bodily movements which are not the result of a person's effort or
determination are excluded from the definition of "voluntary
act."' 77
Although a voluntary act is required for criminal responsibility,
not every act leading to the harm must be volitional.' 78 For example,
if a person has knowledge that she is prone to fainting spells while
driving, she will be subject to criminal liability for any harm result-
ing if she faints while driving. Liability will be imposed, not for the
non-volitional fainting spell, but for the volitional act of driving a
car with knowledge of her likelihood of suffering a fainting spell.'"
The Model Penal Code's definition of "act" complements the Rob-
inson Court's distinction between a non-punishable "status" and a
punishable "act." 18°
D° Id; see also Cuomo, supra note 20, at 487-88.
11 ' Robinson, 370 U.S. at 688 (White, J., dissenting); see Cuomo, supra note 20, at 487-
88.
12 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 689 (White, J., dissenting). See generally Cuomo, supra note 20,
at 487-88.
in See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667-74.
'" See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the Model
Penal Code, section 2.01(1), and what constitutes an "act" in the criminal law).
in Id. § 3.2, at 197 & n.23.
"6 Id. at 198.
ill MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.01(d).
'78 Id. at 199.
'79 Id.
180
 See supra notes 145-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of Robinson
and the Court's language regarding "status."
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In summary, the Robinson majority recognized the inequity of
punishing people for their status. 18 ' Yet Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority, reiterated that the Court did not intend to interfere
unnecessarily with the state's police power.' 82 Justice White, how-
ever, argued in dissent that the majority was leaving open the pos-
sibility of a dangerous expansion of a possible constitutional pro-
tection for addicts. 183 Justice White argued that the Court went too
far in limiting the state's power in this area, and pointed out that
the majority opinion explicitly did not include the right to punish
for use of narcotics in the list of allowable state actions.'" In Powell
v. Texas,' 85 the Court was faced with just such an attempt, and had
to explain further its decision in Robinson.
B. Powell v. Texas
In 1968, six years after Robinson, the Supreme Court in Powell
v. Texas took a narrow view of the Robinson Court's protection of
status crimes, lest the Court become the country's ultimate arbitor
of criminal standards through a broad application of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment.'" In a five
to four opinion, the Powell Court held that a state could criminally
punish a person for being drunk in public.'" The defendant in
Powell was convicted of public drunkenness, with no other act to
establish criminal responsibility.'"
At the trial level, the defense offered evidence that alcoholism
is a disease that inhibits a person's ability to stop using the drug;
that an alcoholic's appearance in public is a non-volitional compul-
sion stemming from his or her disease; and finally, that the plaintiff
was a chronic alcoholic.' 89 The trial court accepted these facts, but
ruled nevertheless that alcoholism was not a defense to the defen-
dant's crime.'" The Powell Court rejected the trial court's accep-
181 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 665.
' 82 Id. at 666.
'68
	
at 688-89 (White, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 688 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White believed that Robinson's use of
narcotics was well-established in the factual record. He explained that the very definition of
"addiction" rests upon repeated use of drugs. Id. at 686. Justice White viewed the omission
of any language concerning "use" as important. Id. at 688.
'" 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
186 See id. at 533.
1" Id. at 535.
188 Id. at 517.
i69 at 521.
190 Id. at 517.
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tance of these facts, reasoning that they were not findings of fact
in the true sense, but only suggestions made by the defense so that
the case could be brought under the Robinson Court's ruling.'"'
In holding that a state could criminally punish a person for
public drunkenness, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, noted
that the factual record in Powell's case did not establish whether
Powell suffered from chronic alcoholism.' 92 The Court reasoned
that if Powell's drinking was not the result of alcoholism, it would
not fit into the Robinson model, and thus would not support the
expansion of the constitutional protection.' 93 The Court also noted
the lack of consensus in the medical community regarding the
definition of alcoholism and compulsion.'"
Justice Marshall also distinguished the facts of Powell from
those in Robinson.' 95 In Powell, the criminal act was public drunken-
ness. The Court construed this as different from the mere status of
being a narcotics addict. justice Black, in his concurring opinion,
viewed this distinction as central to the decision.'`"' Justice Black
stressed that public drunkenness is an offense in every state, and
has been proscribed throughout history.'° 7 Justice Black viewed the
appellant's position as one with vast potential to limit dangerously
the state's power to deal effectively with a widespread social prob-
lem.'"
For Justice White, also concurring, the deciding factor was
the inadequacy of the factual record.' 99 Acknowledging that
some criminal acts cannot be excused just because a person is afflicted
with a disease,m Justice White suggested that he would allow
certain chronic alcoholics to use their alcoholism as a defense
to a charge of public intoxication.20 ' In this case, however,
the record did not establish that Powell could not avoid being in
public. 202
191 Id. at 521.
,92 Id. at 521-22.
199 Id. at 532.,
194 Id. at 534-36.
199 Id. at 532.
1911 Id. at 542 (Black, J., concurring).
197 Id. at 538 (Black, J., concurring).
111 " Id. at 537 (Black, J., concurring),
' 99 Id. at 549 (White, J., concurring).
21x1 Id. at 550 (White, J., concurring). Justice White uses as examples a person with
smallpox, a contagious disease, breaking quarantine, or an epileptic driving a car. Id.
2(} 1 Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring).
2112 Id. at. 552-53 (White, J., concurring).
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Justice Fortas, in dissent, construed the issue as one of punish-
ment for the "condition" of being drunk in public. 203 First detailing
documentation of chronic alcoholism as a disease, Justice Fortas
gave a broad reading to Robinson. 204 Though admitting that Powell
was convicted for more than a mere status, Justice Fortas neverthe-
less argued that the same constitutional principle was involved in
both cases, namely that the Constitution places a substantive limit
on the state's power to define crimes. 205 Viewing chronic alcoholism
as causing the afflicted person to lose all volition regarding his or
her actions, Justice Fortas argued that Powell's act of public intox-
ication fit within the constitutional protection defined in Robinson.206
Since deciding Robinson and Powell, the Supreme Court has
routinely denied certiorari to cases raising similar issues. 207 Thus,
the Court has made no recent application of the Robinson status
defense to the criminalization of addiction. 208
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PREGNANT ADDICTS PROSECUTED AS DRUG TRAFFICKERS
Until recently, states wishing to punish pregnant drug addicts
for potential harm to their fetuses have attempted to do so through
child abuse statutes. 2°9 These attempts have been unsuccessful, usu-
ally because courts have deemed child abuse statues to apply only
to born, rather than unborn, children. 2 t 0 To date, no legislature has
2°' Id. at 559 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 567-68 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Although conceding that the defendant Powell
was convicted for more than a status, Justice Fortas nevertheless argues that Robinson's holding
would also proscribe punishment for a chronic alcoholic's public drunkenness. Justice Fortas
characterizes Robinson as standing for a prohibition on punishing a person for "being in a
condition which he had no capacity to change." Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 566 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
2°0
	 at 567-68 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
207 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (addict with fifteen previous
convictions contended, under Robinson, that it was unconstitutional to punish a non-trafficking
addict for simple possession), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973); Hutcherson v. United States,
345 F.2d 964, (D.C. Cir.) (ten year sentence for heroin possession not unconstitutional under
Robinson), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1963); United States ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344 F.2d
260 (2d. Cir.) (affirming denial of habeas corpus petition by an addict charged with self-
administration of heroin, where the addict had argued that the statute violated the cruel and
unusual punishment clause under Robinson), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965).
2°9 cf. Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372, 1383 (1988) (although not citing to
Robinson or Powell, and without deciding whether or not alcoholism is a disease, the Supreme
Court upheld a determination that primary alcoholics would not be excused from a ten year
limit on using G.I. Bill benefits).
2" See supra notes 9, 70-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of child abuse cases.
210 Id.
May 1991]	 PREGNANT SUBSTANCE ABUSERS 	 655
enacted a statute specifically criminalizing a pregnant woman's con-
duct that does harm to the fetus, although such bills are currently
pending. 211 An inherent difficulty with any such statute would be
possible unconstitutionality under right to privacy arguments. 212
Rather than waiting for legislative action, an increasing number
of states are using drug trafficking laws to effectuate what a specific
statute would do, namely, punish pregnant substance abusers for
their drug use. State v. Johnson . was the first such conviction.2 " By
characterizing the maternal/fetal exchange through the placenta as
a drug "delivery," and focusing on the moment immediately follow-
ing birth (before the umbilical cord is cut), 214 Florida argued that
there was drug delivery to a "child," rather than a fetus. 215 Thus,
the court in the Johnson case was technically able to avoid deciding
whether the drug trafficking statute applied to unborn children. In
a case such as Johnson, then, where the prosecution was able to
circumvent the maternal rights arguments, one must examine more
than the traditional maternal versus fetal rights arguments when
discussing whether drug laws are the appropriate vehicles for state
action against pregnant addicts.
First, this note proposes that the criminal prosecution of preg-
nant drug addicts under drug trafficking statutes is unconstitutional
under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth
amendment. It argues that the maternal-fetal blood exchange
through the placenta is a non-volitional bodily function rather than
a volitional "act" for which criminal responsibility can be imposed.
'" See Comment, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive
and Rehabilitative Approaches, 30 EMORY L, J. 1401, 1428 (1990) (compiling data cited in an
American Civil Liberties Union Memorandum). The Georgia legislature defeated a proposed
bill that would have made drug use during pregnancy a felony. K. Moss, G. Guerrero, K.
Kolbert, Update of State Legislation Regarding Drug Use During Pregnancy 5 (May 22,
1990) (unpublished memorandum on file at the Boston College Law Review). A bill pending
in Ohio provides that women who use drugs during pregnancy may be guilty of a felony
and subject to mandatory tubal ligation. Id. at 10. Similar bills are pending in Indiana and
Hawaii. See S. 598, 107th Ind. Gen..Assembly, 1st Reg. Seas, (introduced Jan, 23, 1991,) and
S.B. 332, 16th Leg., Reg. Sess. (FlaWaii, Jan. 25, 1991.)
2 ' 2 See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of commentators on the
right to privacy issues inherent in "fetal rights" cases.
20 Newborn Drug Conviction, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1.
2" Pregnant Women, supra note 6, at 419. It should be noted that the Johnson prosecution
strategy, where cocaine metabolytes were found in the newborn's urine, has very limited
application. The prosecution's contention that a drug exhange occurred at the moment
immediately following birth, but before the umbilical cord was severed, would only be possible
in cases where the pregnant woman used cocaine within 72 hours of giving birth. Triai
Transcripts, at 155-60, State v. Johnson, No. 89-890—CFA (Seminole County, Fla. 1989).
215 Id.
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Therefore, the placental transfer of drugs from mother to fetus is
a function of the pregnant woman's status of being a pregnant
addict. The criminalization of this status is a form of cruel and
unusual punishment that violates the eighth amendment as inter-
preted in Robinson. 216
Second, this note argues that the state of Florida, although
convicting Ms. Johnson for drug delivery, was actually attempting to
punish Ms. Johnson for her cocaine use during pregnancy. Based
on the Court's reasoning in Robinson and the research characterizing
cocaine as physically addictive, this note suggests that a ,basis exists
for holding that a statute punishing pregnant drug use is unconsti-
tutional under the eighth amendment. 217 Finally, this note concludes
that even if the cruel and unusual punishments clause does not
proscribe a state from punishing a pregnant addict's drug use,
compelling policy arguments urge against using the criminal process
to punish pregnant substance abusers. 2 "
A. The Criminal Act
At first glance, a statute criminalizing the delivery of drugs to
a minor appears to fall completely outside any discussion of whether
the statute is punishing a "status" or an "act." 2 ' 9 Drug trafficking,
usually for profit, is clearly a volitional act, and the Robinson Court
specifically listed it as an act that a state can criminalize. 22° Florida's
characterization in the Johnson case of a pregnant woman's placenta
as the delivery method changes the analysis, however, because the
functioning of the placenta is not the usual type of act that criminal
statutes punish. 221
The Court in Robinson, interpreting the cruel and unusual pun-
ishments clause of the eighth amendment as prohibiting punish-
ment for a status, did not set any criteria as to what really constitutes
an act sufficient to establish criminal liability. 222 The Model Penal
Code, however, states that the criminal act must be volitional."'
21 ' See infra text accompanying notes 219-32.
217 See infra text accompanying notes 233-44.
21 ' See infra text accompanying notes 246-54.
2" See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962) (listing "acts" that states can
constitutionally punish).
220 Id. The Court refers to "sale" of narcotics.
221 See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 174, § 3.2 (citing the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(1) (1962)).
222 See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text for a list of acts punishable by the
state without any accompanying definition of "status."
229 W. LAFAVE & A. Scoyr, supra note 174, § 3.2 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE 2.01(1)).
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Movements that are involuntary, such as a reflex, convulsion, or
movements during sleep, are insufficient to establish criminal lia-
bility. 224 Thus, according to the Model Penal Code, the maternal-
fetal blood exchange during pregnancy would be an involuntary
reflex reaction rather than an act. 225 Theoretically, a woman has
control over whether she becomes pregnant. Once pregnant, how-
ever, she has no control over the maternal-fetal exchange. The
placental exchange, then, is just a function of the status of preg-
nancy. 226 This is analogous to the Robinson Court's distinction be-
tween act and status, in which the Court likened punishment for
being an addict to punishment for a disease. 227 Bodily functions
more closely resemble a status than a volitional act, which is neces-
sary for criminal liability under Robinson. 228
Another factor arises, however, in the Model Penal Code's def-
inition of "act." 229 Under the Code, if a person has knowledge that
he or she is . prone to certain involuntary reflexes, and engages in
an act that may result in harm if that reflex occurs, then criminal
responsibility can be imposed on the person for the act, not the re-
flex. 23° For example, suppose a person prone to fainting spells gets
behind the wheel of a car despite knowledge that fainting is likely
to occur. The person does faint, and an accident occurs, harming a
third party. The volitional act of driving the car, not the involuntary
act of having fainted, will be deemed the necessary act for criminal
liability. 23 '
Using the Model Penal Code analysis, one could argue that a
pregnant woman who takes drugs knowing that she is pregnant, or
knowing that she will exchange drugs with her fetus through the
placenta, can be held liable, just as the driver in the above example.
The placental exchange, however, because it is an involuntary oc-
currence during a healthy pregnancy, is not the cause of criminal
responsibility; it is the act of taking drugs during pregnancy that
satisfies the Model Penal Code definition of "act." 232 The act, in
224 Id.
225 See id.
226 id.
227 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
225 See supra notes 174-80.
229 See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Model Penal
Code's definition of "act."
2" 'V4 LAFAVE & A. Score, supra note 174, § 3.2 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1)
(1962)).
231 Id.
232
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effect, is shifted from the involuntary reflex (fainting spell or pla-
cental transfer) to the act preceding the reflex (driving the car or
taking the drugs).
Thus, criminal responsibility can only be imposed for the act
of taking drugs, rather than the placental delivery, because placental
drug delivery from mother to fetus is a non-volitional bodily func-
tion, not the type of act required under Robinson or the Model Penal
Code. The placental exchange only results from the physical con-
dition of pregnancy. Therefore, punishment for drug delivery
through the placenta is actually punishing a woman for being a
pregnant drug addict. Florida's prosecution of a pregnant woman
for placental drug delivery is therefore an unconstitutional crimin-
alization of the status of maternal drug addiction.
B. Regulation of a Pregnant Woman's Drug Use
Because criminal responsibility can only be imposed for the act
of taking drugs during pregnancy, rather than for placental delivery
alone, Florida and other states prosecuting pregnant drug addicts
under drug trafficking statutes are really punishing the women for
their drug use, coupled with the status of pregnancy. Although this
note argues that punishing a pregnant addict under drug trafficking
laws is an unconstitutional criminalization of status under Robinson,
the question remains whether a state may specifically legislate
against a pregnant addict's drug use.
The Robinson Court, in holding that punishment for the status
of addiction constituted cruel and unusual punishment, noted that
narcotics addiction is a disease. 233 The Court stated that punishing
someone for the disease of addiction is the same as punishing people
with leprosy or venereal disease. 234
 Cocaine addiction should be
treated in the same manner as narcotics addiction, especially when
smoking is the method of administration. 235 The biological model
of addiction suggests that cocaine affects the brain's chemistry in a
manner that causes addicts to develop a physical need for the
drug. 23" Other data shows that addicts continue to use cocaine de-
spite catastrophic consequences, suggesting that an addict has no
control over cocaine consumption. 237
 This data indicates that the
2" Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,667 (1962).
"4
 Id. at 666.
"5 See supra notes 115-36 and accompanying text.
756 supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra notes 124 & 136 and accompanying text.
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effects of cocaine are similar to the effects of narcotics, enough to
justify applying the Robinson protection to cocaine addicts.
Further, the Robinson decision was inconsistent regarding the
constitutionality of punishing an addict for drug use. 238 Although
the Court reiterated that a state could constitutionally regulate drug
use, the Court did not specifically include use in its list of punishable
offenses. 239 Noting this omission in his dissent, Justice White argued
that addiction is defined as the regular use of drugs, and that if it
is cruel and unusual to punish someone for their status as an addict,
it would be difficult to justify punishing the addict for drug use. 24 °
Thus, Justice White was concerned that the constitutional protection
of the status of addiction would include the protection of drug
use. 241
Given that drug addiction cannot occur without drug use, and
the Robinson Court's less than explicit language concerning use, a
statute punishing pregnant drug use might raise issues of uncon-
stitutionality under the eighth amendment. The Powell Court
seemed to deny such a broad reading of Robinson by holding that
punishment for public drunkenness is not cruel and unusual. 242
The Powell Court stated that public drunkenness is an act, not a
status.243 Thus, the Court indicated that the Constitution does not
protect actions stemming from addiction, reasoning that such pro-
tection would include protection for murder, if an addiction-related
compulsion caused the murder. 244
This potential for expansion is absent from cases such as Jen-
nifer Johnson's. If the constitutional protection for status were in-
terpreted to include a pregnant addict's drug use, the only thing
protected is her personal consumption of the drug, rather than any
act resulting from that consumption. Given the Robinson Court's
prohibition on punishing someone for a disease, the nature of
cocaine addiction as a disease for some users, and the lack of the
expansion problem noted in Powell, there is a basis for holding that
punishing a pregnant addict for drug use is cruel and unusual
under the eighth amendment. Fetal rights advocates would argue,
29°
	 supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
29°
	 370 U.S. at 664.
24° Id. at 686, 688 (White, J., dissenting), See Cuomo, supra note 20, for a discussion of
the Robinson Court's treatment of "use."
24 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 686 (White, J., dissenting).
242
 Powell v. United States, 392 U.S. 519, 535 (1967).
249
 Id. at 532.
444 Id. at 534.
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however, that fetal harm or death that is caused by the pregnant
addict's drug use is the equivalent of battery or murder. Considering
the state's interest in protecting human life and the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Reproductive Health Services v. Webster,245 it is un-
likely that courts would interpret Robinson and Powell as constitu-
tionally protecting a pregnant drug addict's drug use. Nevertheless,
there are policy reasons why states should not criminalize pregnant
drug abuse.
C. Policies Against Criminalizing Maternal Drug Use Under Drug
Trafficking Laws
Criminalization of maternal substance abuse, either through
drug laws or specific statutes, will not effectuate state goals of de-
terrence and eradication. First, even if states can constitutionally
legislate against pregnant drug use, there has as yet been no such
legislation and no case law interpreting it. Instead of waiting for
legislative action, state prosecutors are inappropriately applying
drug trafficking laws to pregnant drug users.'" These statutes were
not meant to apply to distribution through the placenta. No other
drug trafficker first has to ingest and metabolize the drug in order
to effectuate the "delivery." Thus, the Johnson approach actually
punishes a pregnant woman for her drug use. Drug delivery, how-
ever, is different from drug use. In fact, the Florida statute under
which Johnson was convicted has a separate clause proscribing drug
use, yet the state did not charge Ms. Johnson with drug use.
Not only is the statute inapplicable, but its use against pregnant
drug users establishes a dangerous precedent that may make women
liable for using legal substances as well as illegal drugs such as
cocaine. For example, many substances that may be legally used by
an adult are illegal if given to a minor. Using the Johnson case as a
model, if a pregnant woman drank one glass of wine, she could be
prosecuted under existing law proscribing delivery of alcohol to a
minor. 247
 If the same woman took a prescription drug, she could
be found guilty of administering the drug to someone (the fetus)
without a prescription. These examples employ the logic of the
24 '5 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3050 (1989) (Court upheld Missouri statute stating that Missouri
laws must be construed to grant unborn children all the "rights, privileges, and immunities
available to other persons").
246 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
24 ' The mother would be transferring alcohol through her umbilical cord. This is the
same logic that the Johnson prosecution employed.
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Johnson prosecution, namely, that there is a statute against these
"deliveries" or "administrations," and it does not matter that their
application to pregnant women is novel. 248 The above examples
illustrate the danger of giving a broad reading to statutes enacted
for situations other than the regulation of maternal conduct during
pregnancy. It is the legislature that must speak to this issue, not
prosecutors and the courts.
Finally, criminalization in general, whether through drug traf-
ficking or other statutes, will not further a state's interest in this
area. 249 If a state truly wishes to protect the potential life and health
of fetuses, then legislators, prosecutors, and judges should examine
the practical effects of criminalization. Many factors indicate that
criminalization is not the answer. 25° First, for many individuals,
cocaine addiction is a disease which requires treatment, not punish-
tnent. 2" It is widely believed that the threat of prison will not deter
pregnant addicts, because a person cannot be deterred from having
a disease. 252 Second, the threat of prosecution may not prevent a
pregnant woman from taking drugs, but it will probably deter her
from seeking prenatal care for fear of discovery. 255
 This will not
serve the state's interest in promoting fetal well-being. Some addicts,
upon discovering that they are pregnant, may even seek to termi-
nate the pregnancy to avoid becoming criminals.
Finally, because criminalization is prospective, it will not pre-
vent harm to the fetus. 254 The harm will be inflicted by the time the
mother is punished, and the state will be left with a damaged child
and an incarcerated mother. If state officials concentrate their ef-
forts on criminalization, rather than education and treatment, preg-
nant drug addicts will continue to give birth to drug-exposed chil-
dren. The victim, the drug-exposed infant, will only be further
victimized by having his or her mother jailed. The very nature of
addiction and pregnancy, therefore, suggests that criminalization
will not advance the state's interests in protecting fetal welfare.
243
 Motion to Dismiss at 27, State v. Johnson, No, 89-890—CFA (Seminole County, Fla.
1989).
2" See supra notes 136, 140-41 and accompanying text.
25° Id.
251 See supra notes 124-36 for a discussion of addiction.
252 See supra notes 136, 140-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether
criminal sanctions would deter a pregnant drug addict from using drugs.
253 See Punishing Pregnant Addicts, supra note 98, at E5, col. 1; Pregnancy Police, supra note
7, at 308.
254 See Punishing Pregnant Addicts, supra note 98, at E5, col. 1; Pregnancy Police, supra note
13, at 308.
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CONCLUSION
Pregnant drug use is on the rise. Newspapers depict the horrors
of cocaine-exposed babies. Something must be done about this
growing problem, yet the answer does not lie in characterizing
pregnant women as drug trafficking felons. The biological realities
of both pregnancy and cocaine abuse dictate against criminalization
of pregnant substance abuse. First, the maternal-fetal exchange
through the placenta is an involuntary act which occurs solely as a
result of a woman's pregnancy. This biological exchange is not the
type of volitional act necessary to invoke criminal responsibility.
Second, strong evidence suggests that cocaine abuse is physically
addictive for some individuals. Thus, punishing a pregnant addict
for delivering drugs to a minor through her umbilical cord is a
violation of the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth
amendment, because the pregnant woman is being punished for
the status of pregnancy, coupled with the condition of addiction.
in addition, criminalization will not effectuate the state goal of
protecting the fetus. Criminalization will only encourage pregnant
drug addicts to avoid prenatal care in order to hide their "crime."
With the dearth of treatment centers able or willing to admit preg-
nant women, pregnant addicts may even turn to abortion rather
than face later prosecution. Further, punishing a pregnant addict
after she has harmed her fetus will not help drug-afflicted children.
States need to develop educational and treatment programs, so that
mothers and children both will be free of addiction.
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